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Recent Developments
O'Callahan v. Parker: A Revolutionary View
of Court-Martial Jurisdiction
In O'Callahan v. Parker,' the Supreme Court held that a member of the
armed forces cannot be tried by court-martial for any offense which is
not shown to be "service-connected." In 1956, O'Callahan, a sergeant in the
United States Army, was charged by military authorities2 with attempted rape,
housebreaking, and assault with intent to commit rape in violation of Articles
80, 130 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice UCMJ.8 The
alleged offenses occurred while O'Callahan, wearing civilian clothes, was off
base with an evening pass. Upon conviction, he was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and a dis-
honorable discharge. After his conviction was affirmed by an Army Board
of Review, O'Callahan filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis with
the United States Court of Military Appeals, alleging that he was denied
due process at his court-martial. 4 This petition was denied5 and O'Callahan
began serving his sentence. While in confinement, he filed with the District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus alleging, inter alia, that the court-martial was without jurisdiction to
try him for nonmilitary offenses which were committed while he was off base
on authorized leave. The district court denied relief6 and the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.7 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari," limiting its consideration to the question of whether a "court-
martial. .. [has] jurisdiction to try a member of the Armed Forces who is
charged with commission of a crime cognizable in a civilian court and having
no military significance, [and which is] alleged to have been committed
1. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
2. O'Callahan was apprehended by a hotel security guard and turned over to the
Honolulu police. When it was discovered that he was a member of the armed forces,
he was turned over to military authorities. id. at 260.
3. 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 930, 934 (1964).
4. Specifically, O'Callahan claimed that certain depositions which were introduced
against him at the court-martial were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights,
viz., his right to counsel, since neither he nor his counsel were present when they were
taken. United States v. O'Callahan, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568 (1967).
5. Id.
6. United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
7. O'Callahan v. Parker, 372 F.2d 136 (1967). This decision, likewise, did not con-
sider the case on its merits. On reargument, however, the Third Circuit did consider
the merits and again affirmed the district court's denial of relief. United States ex rel.
O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (1968).
8. O'Callahan v. Parker, 393 U.S. 822 (1968).
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off-post and while on leave, thus depriving him of his constitutional rights
to indictment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in a civilian court?" 9
The Court, in reversing O'Callahan's conviction, held that a crime, in order
to come under military jurisdiction, must be "service connected, lest 'cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger,' as used in the Fifth Amendment, be ex-
panded to deprive every member of the armed services of the benefits of an
indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a jury of his peers."'1  By so
limiting court-martial jurisdiction, the Court manifested a reluctance to sub-
ject military citizens to a system of "so-called military justice"" which, the
Court believed, was "singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of
constitutional law."'1 2 The decision, however, has consequences which go far
beyond the mere granting of these constitutional protections to a service-
man.13 These effects will presently be considered.
To Apply Constitutional Protections or to Limit Military Jurisdiction
Although the Court, in reversing his conviction, held that O'Callahan was
deprived of his constitutional rights to an indictment by a grand jury14 and
trial by a petit jury,' 5 this part of the decision appears to be a mere smoke
9. Id. Thus phrased, it appears that the Court assumed the very issue to be de-
cided, namely, whether the alleged crimes had any military significance.
10. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969).
11. Id. at 266 n.7.
12. Id. at 265.
13. The decision should not be read to guarantee a serviceman these constitutional
protections in a court-martial proceeding. What it does do, is to allow a serviceman
to be tried in a civilian court.where he will be able to take advantage of these protec-
tions.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury .... ." The amendment, however, contains the exception that this requirement is
not present "in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger . . . ." Id. This provision has been
interpreted to mean that an indictment is not required in courts-martial since Congress
has the constitutional power [U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8] to formulate rules for the regu-
lation of the armed forces. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 500 (1885); Owens v. Markley, 289 F.2d 751
(7th Cir. 1961); Becker v. Webster, 171 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
968 (1949).
The words "when in actual service in time of war or public danger" have been held
to apply to the militia only, and not to the regular members of the armed services. See
Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114 (1895); Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 701
(1882); Owens v. Markley, 186 F. Supp. 604, 606 (S.D. Ind. 1960), ajI'd, 289 F.2d
751 (7th Cir. 1961).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." This right, however,
has been held not to extend to courts-martial. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1




screen for the Court's primary holding that Congress does not have the power
to determine which offenses are triable by courts-martial. This conclusion is
supported to some extent by the fact that the Court has never required
indictment by grand jury in either court-martial proceedings 6 or in state
criminal proceedings' 7 and also the fact that at the time O'Callahan was
convicted, the right to a trial by jury was not required in state criminal
proceedings.' 8 The O'Callahan Court, therefore, attempts to justify its
limitations of the congressional power to regulate the land and naval forces
by invoking the right to an indictment by a grand jury, which right is not
guaranteed to civilians and by the retroactive application of the right to trial
by a petit jury which the Court had previously held was not to be applied
retroactively to civilians in state criminal proceedings, 19 thereby granting
to O'Callahan certain rights which, at the time of his conviction, were not
extended at trials in civilian courts.
Jurisdiction over the Person v. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
Prior to O'Callahan it was generally held that status, i.e., membership in the
armed forces, was a necessary element in conferring court-martial juris-
diction over a person. In Reid v. Covert,20 Justice Frankfurter said that
"[t]rial by court-martial is constitutionally permissible only for persons who
can, on a fair appraisal, be regarded as falling within the authority given to
Congress under Article I to regulate the 'land and naval Forces' . . . .
This statement has been interpreted to mean that "[t]he test for jurisdiction
. . . is one of status, namely, whether the accused in the court-martial pro-
ceeding is a person who can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and
naval Forces.' ",22 In O'Callahan, the Government argued that these cases
16. See note 14, supra.
17. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Morford v. Hocker, 394 F.2d
169, 170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 944 (1968). Although the court in O'Calla-
han does not specifically mention state courts, it does refer to "civilian courts."
However, since federal courts, with the exception of those in the District of Colum-
bia, normally have no jurisdiction over common law crimes such as rape and house-
breaking, it is apparent that "civilian courts" means state courts. The power of Con-
gress to declare an act criminal is limited to acts which have "some relation to the
execution of a power of Congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the
United States. An act not having any such relation is one in respect to which the State
can alone legislate." United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672 (1877). Cf. Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 138 (1945) (dissent).
18. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) the Supreme Court held that the
sixth amendment right to a trial by jury was extended to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. This right, however, was restricted to cases involving "serious"
crimes. Id. at 161-62.
19. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968).
20. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
21. Id. at 42 (concurring).
22. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1960).
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should be read to require trial by court-martial for any person who is a mem-
ber of the armed forces. The Court, rejecting this interpretation, held that
these cases are to be read only as precluding court-martial jurisdiction over
those persons who were not members of the armed forces at the time of the of-
fense.23  The Court said that "'Status' is necessary for jurisdiction; but it
does not follow that ascertainment of 'status' completes the inquiry, regard-
less of the nature, time, and place of the offense."
24
O'Callahan is a departure from these prior cases to the extent that now,
for the first time, not only will the jurisdiction of the military over the person
be considered, but also considered will be the military's jurisdiction over the
particular offense involved. In holding that status was only indicative of
jurisdiction over the person and not over the offense, the Court appeared to
ignore its prior holding in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,25 to the
effect that, given a person's military status, Congress and not the courts
had the power to determine which offenses would be punishable by military
authorities. The Government argued in Kinsella that Reid v. Covert,26 a
case which held that the military did not have jurisdiction over a service-
man's dependent who committed a capital crime, was not applicable to a case
where the offense was noncapital. The Court rejected this argument on the
ground that the dependent was not to be included in the term "land and
naval Forces." As to the power of Congress to define which offenses are
punishable by courts-martial the Court stated:
[T]he power [of Congress] to "make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" bears no limitation
as to offenses. The power there granted includes not only the
creation of offenses but the fixing of the punishment therefor. If
civilian dependents are included in the term "land and naval
Forces" at all, they are subject to the full power granted the
Congress therein to create capital as well as noncapital offenses.
This Court cannot diminish and expand that power, either on a
case-by-case basis or on a balancing of the power there granted
Congress against the safeguards of Article III and the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. Due process cannot create or enlarge power.
(Emphasis added.) 27
23. All of the cases cited by the Government and in turn relied upon by the Court
concerned persons who were not members of the armed forces at the time of their con-
viction. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian
employee of armed forces); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960) (dependent of military personnel overseas); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
(dependent of military personnel); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955) (discharged soldier accused of a crime committed while in the military).
24. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 267 (1969).
25. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
26. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
27. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960).
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Congress is well aware of the scope of jurisdiction it has granted to the
military courts. In 1962, a Senate committee considered the constitutional
rights of military personnel and recommended that no revision of the UCMJ
be made regarding the court-martial of military offenders for civil crimes.28
The committee concluded that to deny the military jurisdiction over its per-
sonnel would put an undue burden on the military in maintaining discipline. 29
The Supreme Court has noted that the framers of the Constitution gave to
Congress the task of defining the rights of military personnel in view of the
demands of military discipline and duty.A0 Congress performed that task
and granted jurisdiction to the military over civilian offenses committed by
servicemen. In O'Callahan, the Court shows its disapproval of this decision
of Congress and takes upon itself the duty of correcting it.
The Scope of Military Jurisdiction
Prior to the Civil War, court-martial jurisdiction was limited to "all crimes
not capital, and all disorders and neglects ... to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline."'' a This "general article" was recognized as
giving the military jurisdiction over only those offenses which had a direct
impact on military discipline 32 and not those the commission of which was
punishable in civilian courtsY.3  Thus, when a member of the armed forces
committed an offense while he was away from the post, on pass or on leave,
he was immune from prosecution by court-martial.34 During the Civil War,
Congress granted to the military jurisdiction over certain offenses without re-
gard to their effect upon military order or discipline. 36  This jurisdiction,
however, was applicable only in times of war, insurrection and rebellion.86
In 1916, Congress amended the Articles of War to provide for court-
28. Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 425 (1962).
29. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JU-
DICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS ON CONSTITUTONAL
RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 22-26 (Comm. Print 1963).
30. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
31. 1776 Articles of War 1, § 18, Art. 5 (reprinted in W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW
AND PRECEDENTS 1503 (1895)) [hereinafter cited as WINTHROP].
32. WINTHROP 1123.
33. This preference for a trial in a civilian court is clearly indicated by the fact
that any commanding officer who willfully refused or neglected to turn an offender
over to civilian authorities was himself subject to dismissal from the service. See 1776
Articles of War § 10, Art. 59, id. at 1071.
34. See WINTHROP 1073-74. This general rule was applicable even when the
accused was a deserter or otherwise on unauthorized leave. Id. at 1073.
35. These offenses included larceny, robbery, burglary, arson, mayhem, manslaugh-
ter, murder, and assault and battery with intent to kill. See Act of March 3, 1863, ch.
75, § 30, 12 Stat. 736.
36. Id.
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martial jurisdiction over "all crimes or offenses not capital" irrespective of
whether a state of war, insurrection or rebellion existed.37 In 1950, Congress
again considered the scope of military jurisdiction and passed the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. 88 Under this code, military jurisdiction was ex-
tended to cover offenses, whether capital or noncapital, committed during
peacetime as well as wartime.
39
It appears from this brief review of the evolution of the scope of military
jurisdiction that it has run a complete cycle, from the limited jurisdiction of
the pre-Civil War period, through the periods of extended jurisdiction, i.e.,
1916 and 1950, back to limited jurisdiction under O'Callahan.40
The "New" Criteria
In announcing its "new" criteria for military jurisdiction, the Court's choice
of the term "service connected" is unfortunate since the phrase is without a
background in military law.41 While the Court tersely criticizes Article 134
as unconstitutionally vague, the "service connected" criterion appears to be
no less vague.
37. Act of August 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 650, 666. Under Article 92, any
person subject to military law (Article 2) who committed murder or rape was to be
punished as a court-martial might direct. A court-martial did not, however, have
jurisdiction over a rape or murder committed by a serviceman in one of the states or in
the District of Columbia. Id. at 664. As to noncapital crimes, these were punishable
by court-martial irrespective of whether they were committed in a state or in the
District of Columbia. Id. Art. 93.
38. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107.
39. Under Article 18 (10 U.S.C. § 818 (1964) ) a general court-martial has juris-
diction "to try persons subject to this [code] for any offense made punishable by this
[code] . . . ." Under Article 118 (10 U.S.C. 918 (1964)) persons subject to the
code can be tried and punished for murder, a capital offense, regardless of where the
murder was committed.
40. Considering the holding in O'Callahan, it is reasonably accurate to suggest that
the Court desired to return to the pre-Civil War standards of limited jurisdiction.
In fact, some of the reasons given by the Court in O'Callahan for limiting court-martial
jurisdiction to service-connected offenses are strikingly similar to those discussed by
Winthrop when considering the 1776 Articles of War in his treatise on military juris-
diction. For example, the O'Callahan Court emphasized that the offenses were com-
mitted in peacetime and had no connection with O'Callahan's military duties (395 U.S.
258, 273 (1969)). Winthrop, in discussing the limitations on military jurisdiction un-
der the original Articles of War, said that there was no military jurisdiction where the
defendant's acts were committed in a civil capacity in time of peace (WINTHROP
1072). The O'Callahan Court also stressed that the offenses committed did not involve
a flouting of military authority (395 U.S. 258, 274 (1969) ), while Winthrop stressed
that there was no military jurisdiction where the offense did not involve "insubordina-
tion or failure to comply with a lawful order" (WINTHROP 121 ).
41. In a computer search by Air Force Project LITE of 37 volumes of the opinions
of the Court of Military Appeals and the Military Boards of Review, the phrase "service
connected" appeared only once and in that instance was not material to any issue in
the case. Interview with Mr. Louis Evans, Assistant to Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., in
Washington, D.C., Aug. 14, 1969.
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In earlier cases, the Court has looked to the maintenance of "obedience and
fighting fitness,"' 42 "prompt . . . means of compelling. . order" 43 and "dis-
cipline of the army" 4 4 in considering court-martial jurisdiction. Judging from
the Court's past regard of these factors and its strong reliance on Winthrop's
treatise, the term "to the prejudice of good order and discipline" would be a
logical starting point to attempt to define "service connected." Furthermore,
if the Court is returning to the standards of court-martial jurisdictions existing
prior to the Civil War, Winthrop's analysis of this term, which at that time
had legal significance, 45 will provide some guidance for determining what is
"service connected."
Modeled after British military law, Article 62 of the 1776 Articles of War
(the predecessor of Article 134) provided for the punishment of "all
crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects, . . . to the prejudice of
good order and military discipline, though not mentioned in the foregoing
articles of war. .... *46 The term "to the prejudice of good order and mili-
tary discipline" was understood to mean directly prejudicial, not merely in-
directly or remotely prejudicial. Also, the act or duty neglected must have
been one which the military person could legally and properly be called upon
to perform. A failure to comply with a civil order, however, was not con-
sidered a neglect to the "prejudice of good order and military discipline."
47
The phrase "to the prejudice of good order and military discipline" quali-
fied the term "crime" as well as the term "disorders and neglects." It was
well understood that a crime, in order to be subject to the jurisdiction of a
court-martial under Article 62, must have directly offended against the gov-
ernment and discipline of the military state. 48 It would appear, therefore,
that if the Court is in fact returning to the pre-Civil War scope of military
jurisdiction then the Government, in order to obtain court-martial jurisdiction
over a military defendant for a "service connected" crime, must demonstrate
that the offense was directly and significantly prejudicial to the government
or discipline of the armed forces.
42. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
43. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955).
44. Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 700 (1882).
45. See 1776 Articles of War 62, WINTHROP 1118.
46. Id. This "general article" soon became known as the "Devil's Article" because
of the high number of servicemen prosecuted under its provisions. Whenever the of-
fense was not described or provided with a punishment under another article, or when
doubt arose as to which of two or more articles should be applied against an offender,
the "comprehensive and serviceable" provisions of Article 62 were used as the foundation
for the charge. See WINTHROP 1119.
47. WINTHROP 1123. Note, however, that included in Winthrop's tabulation of
"neglects and disorders," were the destruction of civilian property and disorderly con-
duct while in town. Id. at 1124-36.
48. Id. at 1123-24.
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O'Callahan and Retroactivity
While statistics on the number of military personnel who were convicted by
courts-martial since the Uniform Code of Military Justice was adopted are not
available at this time, the tabulation in Appendix II of the Government's
brief gives some indication of the number of cases which would be affected
if O'Callahan is applied retroactively. 49 In addition to its effect on convicted
military offenders presently serving sentences imposed by courts-martial,
O'Callahan could affect military records, types of dismissals, questions of
back pay, veterans' rights, burial rights and other benefits.
The considerations determining retroactive application of a Supreme Court
ruling may differ significantly depending upon whether a decision is based
upon the protection of the accused's constitutional rights or upon a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the part of the deciding court. It is therefore
imperative that the basis for the O'Callahan decision be clearly delineated.
It has generally been held since Linkletter v. Walker5" that the Constitu-
tion neither requires nor prohibits retroactive application of decisions ex-
pounding new constitutional rules affecting criminal trials and numerous
new constitutional rules have been denied retroactive application.5' In
Duncan v. Louisiana52 the Supreme Court held that the right to a trial by
jury was so basic to our concepts of liberty and justice that the right is
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in all cases which
would have been tried by jury if prosecuted in a federal court.5s In De-
Stefano v. Woods,54 the Court faced the question of whether Duncan
should be applied retroactively. In ruling that Duncan should receive only
49. From 1956 to 1967, a total of 105,109 nonmilitary offenses were tried by Air
Force courts-martial resulting in 88,648 convictions. In the years 1966-68, the Army
tried 808 defendants by general courts-martial for civil offenses, convicting 699.
Air Force figures also show that 34 percent of the offenses tried by courts-martial
were "civil" offenses while Army figures show that 20 percent of its court-martial
cases involved "civil" offenses. See Brief for Respondent at App. II, O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
50. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
51. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) ); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966)
(rule in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), that a defendant's fifth amendment
right against self incrimination was violated by the prosecutor's commenting on the
defendant's failure to testify); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) ("Miranda
warnings" as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967) (the assistance of counsel at line-ups as required by United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (the right
to a trial by jury in state criminal proceedings as set down in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968)); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (exclusion of evidence
obtained in violation of the Federal Communications Act, Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378
(1968) ).
52. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
53. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
54. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
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prospective application the Court applied the same criteria for determining
retroactivity as it expressed in Stovall v. Denno.55 The Court indicated that
the purpose of the new requirement of trial by jury would not be served by
requiring the retrial of all persons convicted without benefit of a jury and that
the states had relied in good faith in a great number of cases on the old rule.5 6
Similarly, the military courts have relied in good faith, in a large number
of cases,57 on the rule that trial by jury did not apply to military personnel
who were tried by courts-martial.5 8 It would appear that, in view of De-
Stefano, if O'Callahan is based on the right to trial by jury, its rule should
be applied prospectively only.
If, however, O'Callahan is based on the military's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction the question of retroactive application is a bit more complicated.
The fact that the court rendering a judgment was found to have lacked subject
matter jurisdiction does not automatically render the judgement void. 59 It is
only where the court clearly exceeds its jurisdictional grant that its judgment
is void.60 The court must be given the power to interpret the language of the
instrument from which it derives its jurisdiction in order to determine
whether it has jurisdicton over the subject matter in a given case.,' Barring
a complete usurpation of power, even a finding that the statute under which
the court proceeded was later held to be unconstitutional will not render the
judgment void if the court otherwise has jurisdiction over similar subject
matter. 6
2
Since the military courts have subject matter jurisdiction over crimes which
are "service connected" and which crimes are in substance the same as their
civil counterparts, and since the military courts did not usurp subject matter
jurisdiction over crimes which were not "service connected" it would appear
that O'Callahan should be applied prospectively even if it is based on the
military courts' lack of jurisdiction. This is especially necessary if O'Calla-
han is read as denying to the military subject matter jurisdiction which it had
previously possessed.
55. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The criteria to be utilized in determining whether a
ruling should be applied retroactively are: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new
[constitutional] standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement au-
thorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards." Id. at 297.
56. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 634 (1968).
57. See note 49, supra.
58. See note 15, supra.
59. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). See
also Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S.
156 (1932).
60. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Kalb
v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
61. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
61 Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
Military Reaction to O'Callahan
Since the O'Callahan decision, military prosecutors have been instructed to
endeavor to establish some military connection or significance in each case at
the trial level in order to avoid post trial litigation challenging military juris-
diction.63  When the specification alleges a crime cognizable in a civilian
court, military trial counsel are instructed to establish the military connection
by witnesses and by documentary evidence where possible. The Army
Judge Advocate General feels that the "service connected" requirement
may be established by answers to the following questions:
A. Was the accused on leave, pass, duty or in an unauthorized
absence status at the time?
(1) If on leave or pass, when was he due to return to duty?
(2) If on duty, was he in the actual performance of any
specific military duty?
(3) If so, was the accused's military position employed or
abused in any way perpetrating the alleged offense?
(4) Was he in uniform or otherwise identified with the mil-
itary at the time?
B. What, if any, relationship existed between the accused's military
duties and the alleged crime?
C. To what extent is the trial essential to the maintenance of
discipline? If essential, identify the specific military interests
which would be promoted by such trial.
D. Was the alleged offense committed on a military post, camp,
or station? If not, exactly where did the incident take place
and how far from the nearest military installation?
E. Was the alleged victim, if any, a person subject to the Code?
(1) If so, was he performing any duties relating to the mil-
itary at the time?
(2) If not, what was his status and relationship to the mil-
itary (e.g., civilian employee of the Army; dependent wife
or child; employee of a nonappropriated fund; FBI agent
acting for the military)?
F. Does the alleged offense involve any question of the flouting
of military authority? If so, what were the facts and circum-
stances?
G. Does the alleged offense involve any question of the security
of a military post? If so, what were the facts and circum-
stances?
H. Does the alleged offense involve any question of the integrity
of military property? If so, what were the facts and circum-
stances?6
4
63. See Message from the Army Judge Advocate General to Staff Judge Advocates,




While it is perhaps too early to accurately formulate a working definition
of "service connected," it is necessary to note that arguments have been heard
in the United States Court of Military Appeals which may help "carve out"
the boundaries of this presently vague criterion. Included are cases which
involve rape in a military housing area;65 larceny from a fellow serviceman
while off base; 66 and possession and use of marijuana both on and off base.
67
Some cases have already been decided and give an indication as to how the
service connected test will be applied. In a Navy Board of Review case66
the Board held that the use of LSD off-base is clearly a "service connected"
offense within the doctrine of O'Callahan, since the Navy has an obligation to
furnish the user with medical care and since, in the view of some medical
authorities, the use of LSD may render a person totally unfit to perform his
military duties.
In another Navy Board of Review case69 the accused was charged with
housebreaking (and other offenses) off the military reservation while on
unauthorized leave. The Board held that the circumstances of the case were
such as would come under O'Callahan but refused to apply O'Callahan
retroactively.
In United States v. Rine,70 the United States Court of Military Appeals
affirmed a conviction in a case involving the fatal stabbing of one service-
man by another while in Thailand. This decision, however, was subject to
a vigorous dissent which in part argued that the petitioner's counsel should
be given an opportunity to brief the applicability of O'Callahan to the facts
of this case. 71 This dissent implies that at least one member of that court
considered that O'Callahan might have a retroactive application. Subse-
quently, in United States v. Borys,72 the Court of Military Appeals, by a vote
of two to one, held that the O'Callahan decision was retroactively applicable.
Captain Borys had been arrested for the crimes of rape, robbery, sodomy
65. United States v. Smith, No. 22,180 (U.S.C.M.A., Sept. 26, 1969). The court
held that since the offenses occurred on the base, there was a sufficient "service-con-
nection" to confer jurisdiction on the military. Id. at 2.
66. Rego v. United States, No. 21,661 (U.S.C.M.A., Oct. 10, 1969); Camacho v.
United States, No. 21,659 (U.S.C.M.A., Oct. 10, 1969); Plamondon v. United States,
No. 21,569 (U.S.C.M.A., Oct. 10, 1969).
67. United States v. Beeker, No. 21,787 (U.S.C.M.A., Sept. 12, 1969). The court
ordered a reversal of the defendant's conviction and a dismissal of the charges of
importing and transporting marihuana. This part of the decision reflected adherence to
O'Callahan in that these crimes were committed off base and were punishable in the
civilian courts. The defendant's conviction on the remaining three counts, however, was
affirmed since there was ample "military significance" to confer jurisdiction. Id. at 3.
68. United States v. Reid, No. 691762 (N.C.M., June 11, 1969).
69. United States v. Spears, No. 691277 (N.C.M., June 6, 1969).
70. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 421 (1969).
71. United States v. Rine, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 421, 426 (1969).
72. No. 21,501 (U.S.C.M.A., Sept. 5, 1969).
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and attempts to commit these crimes. These offenses were committed in
Georgia and South Carolina. In 1965 he was tried and acquitted in a South
Carolina state court. In 1967, however, he was tried by military court-
martial for these same offenses, convicted and sentenced to a long prison
term. All of the crimes alleged to have been committed by Captain Borys
occurred while he was off duty, on leave, and involved only civilian personnel.
The only "service connection" in the case was the presence of a bumper
sticker on his automobile identifying him as a military officer. In reversing
the Captain's conviction, the majority concluded that O'Callahan "requires
us to set aside the findings of guilty and sentence and order the charges dis-
missed, relegating accused's case to such action as the State of Georgia
may wish to take in light of his alleged transgressions. '78 Thus, the Court of
Military Appeals has given O'Callahan full retroactive effect, opening the
door for a flood of appeals by incarcerated servicemen.
Conclusion
In an effort to "restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed
absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active serv-
ice"74 the Supreme Court reversed the presumption enjoyed by military
courts concerning their jurisdiction over military offenders. The military will
now be expected to demonstrate, on the record, their jurisdiction in each
criminal case.
The Court no longer will hold that the reputation of the military in the
civilian community constitutes sufficient military need, nor will it accept
the argument that a military court-martial is a stronger deterrent to crime
by military personnel than a civil trial.75
In the absence of more current reasons than those used by the Court in
limiting the scope of military jurisdiction over military personnel, it would
appear that Congress, not the Supreme Court, is better equipped to weigh
the needs of the military against the constitutional protections to be granted
to our military citizens and strike the balance in view of policy and ex-
perience. The Court's reliance on such an old writing as Winthrop's
Military Law and Precedents, notwithstanding its highly respected reputation,
appears to add validity to the dissenting opinion's statement that the Court
73. Id. at 7. In United States v. Shockley, No. 21,667 (U.S.C.M.A., Sept. 26,
1969) the Court reversed the court-martial conviction of the accused based on acts
of sodomy which occurred off base. The court affirmed his conviction relative to those
acts of sodomy which occurred on base.
74. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955).
75. This was the position of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 49 (1957).
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relied upon "what are at best wholly inconclusive historical data" which fall
short of supporting its conclusion.7
Having undertaken the task of scrutinizing military justice in an attempt to
secure constitutional protections for the military defendant, however, it is
unfortunate that the Court chose to limit military jurisdiction over "civil"
crimes rather than face the more basic problem of protecting the constitu-
tional rights of our military citizens by moving to correct the weaknesses
from within the system. Perhaps the Court's distrust of "so-called military
justice" 77 will be the impetus for it to recognize, as did the District Court
for the District of Columbia in Kaufman v. Secretary of the Air Force,
78
that the military establishment is not a foreign jurisdiction, but a specialized
one. Unless the military can show a need for a different rule, the constitu-
tional protections guaranteed to civilians must also be granted to military per-
sonnel. The time has come for all to recognize that an individual should not
be required to forfeit the protections of the Constitution simply because he
joins the armed forces.
Gelbman v. Gelbman: The Demise of Parent-Child Tort
Immunity in New York-Recognition of a Terminal Illness
Early in 1969, the New York Court of Appeals in Gelbman v. Gelbman,'
ruled that suits between children and their parents for nonwillful torts are
permissible, notwithstanding the argument that such suits have serious con-
sequences on family unity and encourage fraudulent claims. This decision
effectively put to rest in New York the doctrine prohibiting such parent-child
suits, a doctrine which had been extant in that state since 1928. Considering
the weight given to decisions of the New York Court of Appeals by the
courts of other jurisdictions and in light of the New York court's com-
ments in Gelbman concerning the insurance industry, an analysis of this case
and the possible effects it may have on future decisions by the courts and the
insurance companies is warranted.
The Birth of the Doctrine
The parent-child immunity doctrine prohibits suits between parent and minor
child for personal injuries arising from nonwillful torts committed by one
76. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 274 (1969).
77. Id. at 266 n.7.
78. - F. Supp. - (1969).
1. 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
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against the other. It has no precedent in English common law.2  Rather, it
was first enunciated in 1891 by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Hewell-
ette v. George,8 a case involving a willful tort suit brought by a daughter
against her mother for maliciously confining the child in an insane asylum.
There, without citation for its assertion, the court said:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right
to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
4
The doctrine thereafter was applied to cases involving negligently caused in-
juries without any change in its underlying reasoning5 and eventually became




Through the years, however, the parent-child immunity doctrine has been
gradually eroded by judicial decisions which have increasingly limited its
2. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REy.
1030, 1059 (1930); W. PROSSER, TORTS 886 (3d ed. 1964); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423,
425 (1951).
3. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885.
4. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
5. See, e.g., Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
6. See Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J.
201, 202 (1967); Barlow v. Iblings, - Iowa -, 156 N.W.2d 105, 111 (1968). Among
the states that have adopted the doctrine are: Alabama, Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem.
Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Arizona, Purcell v. Frazer, 7 Ariz. App. 5, 435
P.2d 736 (1967); Arkansas, Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468
(1938); Connecticut, Bricault v. Deveao, 21 Conn. Supp. 468, 157 A.2d 604 (Super.
Ct. 1960); Florida, Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So. 2d 7 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Georgia,
Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Iowa, Barlow v. Iblings,
- Iowa -, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968); Kentucky, Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346
S.W.2d 482 (1961); Maine, Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (1966); Maryland, Schneider
v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930); Massachusetts, Luster v. Luster, 299
Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Missouri, Brown v. Parker, 375 S.W.2d 594 (Ct. App.
1964); Nebraska, Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959); New Jersey,
Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); New Mexico, Nahas v. Noble,
77 N.M. 139, 420 P.2d 127 (1966); North Carolina, Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577,
118 S.E. 12 (1923); Oklahoma, Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (1964); Oregon, Chaf-
fin v. Chaffin, 239 Ore. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964); Rhode Island, Castellucci v. Cas-
tellucci, 96 R.I. 134, 188 A.2d 467 (1963); South Carolina, Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517,
155 S.E. 888 (1930); Tennessee, McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664
(1903); Texas, Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Civ. App. 1954); Virginia, Nor-
folk S. R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934); Washington, Roller v.
Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905); Wyoming, Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269
P.2d 302 (1954).
7. "To some degree at least, the Mississippi case has been followed by most of the




scope. The doctrine has been held not to apply in actions where the child
was emancipated;" when the suit involved an injury to property;9 when per-
sonal injuries were willfully inflicted; 10 where the parent-child relationship
had been terminated by the death of one of the parties;" where through his
"outrageous conduct" the parent was held to have temporarily abdicated
his parental responsibilities; 12 where the child's injuries were caused by his
parent's acting in a business capacity;'8 and when the parent involved in
the suit was not the natural parent.' 4 In spite of these exceptions, the gen-
eral rule still prevailed. But in 1963, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled
that suits were allowable for nonwillful torts between parent and child except
in those instances "(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise
of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act
involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the pro-
vision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other
care."' 5 Minnesota, in Balts v. Balts, decided in 1966, abrogated the doc-
trine in tort actions brought by a parent against a child but specifically
mentioned that it was not passing on the doctrine when raised as a defense in
an action brought by a child against his parent.' 6 New Hampshire was
the first jurisdiction to abrogate the doctrine totally, allowing suits by either
party in any action based on nonwillful injury.' 7
In each of those three cases, the individual courts dealt with the same
basic contentions in favor of the rule and in each the court found the
presence of insurance the vital factor in negating any possibility of family
discord in the bringing of the suit.
8. This exception to the rule was noted in Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711,
9 So. 885, 887 (1891). See also Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 121, 152 S.E. 278,
279 (1930); Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745, 746 (Mo. 1959). Emancipation has
been defined as the primary sense of "complete severance of the filial tie, and an entire
surrender of care and custody of the child, as well as renunciation of parental duties."
Thompson v. Thompson, 264 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Ky. 1954).
9. Suits have been successfully maintained which involved contracts, wills and in-
heritances. W. PROSSER, TORTS 886 (3d ed. 1964).
10. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956). See also Cannon v.
Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 429, 40 N.E.2d 236, 238 (1942) (dictum).
11. Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962). See also Vidmar
v. Sigmund, 192 Pa. Super. 355, 162 A.2d 15 (1960) (willful tort).
12. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67
Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965).
13. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952). Contra, Barlow v.
Iblings, - Iowa -, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968).
14. Burdick v. Nawrocki, 21 Conn. Supp. 272, 154 A.2d 242 (Super. Ct. 1959).
15. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963).
16. 273 Minn. 419, 433, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75.
17. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
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The Doctrine in New York
New York adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine in a memorandum
decision issued in 1928. In Sorrentino v. Sorrentino'8 the Court of Ap-
peals of New York affirmed without comment the decision of the Appellate
Division which had held that an action for personal injuries resulting from
negligence may not be maintained against a parent by an unemancipated
child.
The doctrine was reaffirmed in Cannon v. Cannon19 by a unanimous vote.
Here, the plaintiff, an unemancipated child, sued his father and the estate of
his mother for injuries sustained in an auto accident. At the time of the
accident his mother was driving the car with his father's permission.
Recognizing the rule in Sorrentino, plaintiff argued that the rationale in the
case of Rozell v. Rozell 20 (decided after Sorrentino) should allow a suit be-
tween him and his parents. Rozell had allowed a suit by a brother against
his sister. But the court in Cannon rejected the plaintiff's contention since it
felt that the "natural kinship between parent and child . . . involves legal
duties peculiar to that relationship .... ,,21 The court further noted that
"if within the wide scope of daily experiences common to the upbringing of
a child a parent may be subjected to a suit for damages for each failure to
exercise care commensurate with the risk . . . a new and heavy burden will
be added to parenthood. '22
In Badigian v. Badigian,23 a third case involving the doctrine that was
heard before the New York Court of Appeals, the court, by a vote of six to
one, affirmed the parent-child immunity doctrine, calling it "a direct appli-
cation of a concept that cannot be rejected without changing the whole
fabric of our society, a fundamental idea that is at the bottom of all com-
munity life."'24 As it had earlier in Cannon, the court intimated that if any
change were to be made in the doctrine's application, such change was within
the province of the legislature.
But in Badigian, in a lone dissent, Associate Judge Fuld argued for the
doctrine's abolition. He found the rule to be "based on dubious prophecy
and, at least when applied to deny redress in automobile negligence cases,
[to be] wrong in principle and at odds with justice and modem-day reali-
18. 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (mem.), aff'g, 222 App. Div. 835, 226 N.Y.S. 907
(1928) (mem.). The vote in the Court of Appeals was four to three with then Chief
Judge Cardozo and Associate Judges Crane and Andrews dissenting without comment.
19. 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942).
20. 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939).
21. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 427-28, 40 N.E.2d 236, 237 (1942).
22. Id. at 429, 40 N.E.2d at 238.
23. 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961).
24, Id. at 474, 174 N.E.2d at 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37.
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ties.125 Judge Fuld catalogued the various exceptions which different courts
had carved out of the doctrine.26 He also undertook to point out the im-
portance of insurance as a consideration in abrogating the doctrine.27 It
was Judge Fuld's dissent which was to be the basis of the Court of Appeals'
turn-about decision in Gelbman some seven years later.
In Gelbman, plaintiff was seriously injured while riding as a passenger
in an automobile owned by her but driven by her 16-year-old son. Her suit
was based on his allegedly negligent conduct as driver and the insurance
company, which represented her son in the action, interposed as an affirm-
ative defense the fact that the defendant was the unemancipated son of the
plaintiff. The trial court relied on the prior decisions in Sorrentino, Cannon
and Badigian and dismissed the complaint.28 This determination was unan-
imously affirmed by the Appellate Division.29
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts and in the process buried
the parent-child immunity doctrine forever in New York. s0 The opinion8l
noted that the court in Badigian bad set forth three reasons for maintaining
the parent-child immunity doctrine. First, the court in the earlier case had
noted that no other jurisdiction had seen fit to abolish the doctrine.8 2 The
Gelbman court noted that since Badigian was decided in 1961 there had
been a "judicial erosion" of the doctrine in courts of sister states.83
Secondly, the Badigian court had reiterated the feelings expressed in
Cannon that the legislature should undertake any changes that were to be
25. Id. at 474-75, 174 N.E.2d at 720, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 37. o
26. See notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text.
27. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 479, 174 N.E.2d 718, 722-23, 215 N.Y.S.2d
35, 41 (1961).
28. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 52 Misc. 2d 412, 275 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1966).
29. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 28 App. Div. 2d 826, 282 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1967) (mem.).
30. The court in Gelbman noted that though the three cases relied upon by the trial
court dealt with suits by minors against their parents, which was converse of the
Gelbman situation, still the "underlying policy considerations which influenced those
decisions-if presently viable-should [have been] equally determinative" of the appeal
in Geibman. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 436, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.
2d 529, 530 (1969).
31. Associate Judge Burke wrote the unanimous opinion. He had joined with the
majority in Badigian when now Chief Judge Fuld wrote the sole dissent. The remain-
ing five judges who joined in Gelbman were not on the Court of Appeals when Badigian
was decided.
32. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 473, 174 N.E.2d 718, 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d
35, 36 (1961).
33. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 530 (1969). Though the court gave no citation to other states, it must surely have
been alluding to the action of Minnesota, Wisconsin and New Hampshire. In addition
to these three states, Illinois, in Schenk v. Schenk, 100 111. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12
(1968) declared the doctrine abrogated in situations not connected with the family re-
lationship. Id. at 202, 241 N.E.2d at 15.
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made in the doctrine. 4 The Gelbman opinion noted that in the face of the
judicial erosion of the doctrine in other states, the legislature in New York
had demonstrated no inclination to abrogate the rule through statutory
action. The court felt that such inaction by the legislature illustrated the
fact that "the rule will be changed, if at all, by a decision of this court. 83
5
Since the doctrine was created by judicial decision, it was within the purview
of the courts to take the lead in abrogating the doctrine.
The third reason advanced by the Badigian court was that the doctrine
was essential to the preservation of family unity.86 The court in Gelbman
reversed its prior thinking and said that, in the circumstances of the case,
family unity could only be preserved by permitting the action.8 7 Adopting
the view that such action could be validly construed as the manifestation of the
parent's right to discipline and punish his child, the court determined that
such an action "would be a proper exercise of parental authority, which
authority should not be impaired by the doctrine of intrafamily tort im-
munity. '
38
The court, in addition to refuting the three reasons raised in Badigian
for the preservation of the doctrine, also commented on the effect of the
presence of insurance in New York, a compulsory insurance state. The
court felt that insurance removed finally and effectively the argument favor-
ing continued family harmony as a basis for prohibiting the suit. The court
discerned that the litigation, when an insurer is present, becomes in reality
an action between the injured party and the insurance carrier. Thus, the
harmony of the family could hardly be impeded by this action. The presence
of insurance also effettively counters the Gelbman court's own argument
that an action brought by a parent against his child for a nonwillful tort
could be viewed as a proper exercise of parental authority. If, as the court
said, the litigation was really between the injured party and the insurance
company, then the child could never be said to be disciplined or punished
by this action, since he is removed from it.
Countering the argument that permitting suits like the one in Gelbman
would encourage fraudulent lawsuits, the court voiced its confidence in the
ability of the jury to distinguish between valid and fraudulent claims.
39
34. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 474, 174 N.E.2d 718, 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d
35, 37 (1961).
35. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 530 (1969).
36. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 474, 174 N.E.2d 718, 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d
35, 36-37 (1961).
37. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 530 (1969).
38. Id. at 437, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
39. Id. at 438-39, 245 N.E.2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 532. "Just as strong a
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The Importance of Insurance in Abrogation of the Doctrine
Most of the litigation in which the doctrine has come into play has involved
automobile accidents. In that regard, the presence of insurance has been the
most telling point in the argument favoring the abolition of the doctrine.
4 0
Insurance covers legal liability; it does not create liability where none exists
initially.4 ' The mere fact that the particular defendant is protected by lia-
bility insurance does not enable the injured party to maintain an action
when, in the absence of such insurance, he would not be able to otherwise
maintain it.42
The presence of insurance is important, however, since it "tends to negate
any possible disruption of family harmony and discipline. '48  A fund to pro-
vide care for injuries is available and, hence, the fear of impoverishing the
family through unexpected medical and other expenses, and thereby destroy-
ing family harmony, is removed.4 4 As noted in Gelbman, when insurance is
present the suit is actually one between the injured party and the insurance
company and there is no possibility of family harmony being disturbed by
this type of suit.
It has been argued, however, that to allow suits between parent and child
for nonwillful torts would lead to collusion between the parties.4 5  It is said
possibility of fraud exists in suits between close friends and between relatives, es-
pecially in intersibling suits, and yet a cause of action is not denied in those cases."
1967 U. ILL. L.F. 805, 807.
40. Professor McCurdy, who in his 1930 article, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, supra note 2, listed seven reasons in support of the doctrine that a child has
no cause of action for a personal injury inflicted by the parent upon him while a
minor, Id. at 1072-77, said this about insurance coverage in an article written 30
years later:
It is apparent that the two reasons which have come to be regarded as
the principal, if not the only, ones for denying a cause of action in tort between
parent and minor child, viz. danger of disrupting or disturbing domestic tran-
quility and interference with the exercise of parental rights and the per-
formance of parental duties in the matter of rearing and disciplining the
child, have no application when the action is, in substance if not in form,
against an insurance company which will pay the damages recovered.
McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521, 546 (1960).
41. Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d 570 (1963); Hinkle, Intrafamily Liti-
gation-Parent and Child, 1968 INs. L.J. 133, 143.
42. McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, supra note 40, at 545.
43. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
44. 12 S.D.L. REV. 364, 368 (1967). One court has gone so far as to say: "We
concur in the view that where a child is protected by liability insurance there is more
likelihood of friction, resentment, and discord by a parent's failure to assert a claim
than by instituting suit." Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 430, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73
(1966). Further, without the presence of insurance, the chances of any party's
bringing a suit are remote. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 435, 224 A.2d 588, 590
(1966).
45. "Common sense, not to speak of judicial omniscience, recognizes that this type of
litigation [parent-child nonwillful tort suits] almost invariably amounts to a fictionalized
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that since insurance coverage places upon the insured a duty to cooperate
with the insurer, cooperation would be endangered when a parent is other-
wise responsible for medical expenses of a family member. It is alterna-
tively contended that in the case of the injured child, he is probably ignorant
of his legal rights and so it is not he who initiates the suit but rather someone
in his family, possibly the defendant. Thus, it is said these suits would be
collusive and would lead to the disintegration of the family's individual
integrity.
46
It should first be noted that in these actions "[f]raud is never pre-
sumed."'47 Actions between husband and wife, between brother and sister,
between near relatives, and between host and guest are allowed in many
states. The possibility of collusion is as great in these other actions. The
Minnesota court, reviewing this contention in Balts, looked to the jurisdictions
where interspousal immunity had been abolished and found that "[n]othing
has come to our attention which indicates that these jurisdictions are deluged
with collusive actions or that such litigation is ridden with fraud."4s
Each court that has had to contend with the collusion argument has
placed its final trust in the ability of the court system itself to ferret out fraud-
ulent claims. The Gelbman court noted that "[t]here are analogous situ-
ations in which we rely upon the ability of the jury to distinguish between
valid and fraudulent claims. The effectiveness of the jury system will per-
tain in the present situation. '49
It should be noted that a great number of states, not including New York,
have enacted automobile guest statutes which restrict the liability of an owner
or operator of an automobile for injury to gratuitous guests to those in-
stances in which the driver commits a willful or wantonly negligent act lead-
ing to the passenger's injury or where the driver is grossly negligent or in-
toxicated and as such causes the accident. Hence, the abolition of the parent-
child immunity doctrine in states with guest statutes will still not afford the
injured relative a clear path to recovery in view of the criteria established
by the guest statutes, where such relative is, as is likely, a gratuitous guest.
This consideration is all the more important since most of the litigation in
which the parent-child immunity doctrine has been invoked has involved
automobile accidents.
action against the parent's liability insurer, and, as such, is patently collusive." 17
DEF. L.J. 586, 594 (1968).
46. Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960).
47. Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 833, 113 S.E.2d 875, 878 (1960).
48. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 430, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (1966).
49. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 532 (1969). See also Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 430, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73
(1966); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434-35, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966).
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A further argument has been raised that since automobile liability insur-
ance premiums are based on recent experience and since there is no loss
experience as to injuries involved in parent-child nonwillful tort suits, the
current rates do not contemplate such indemnity. 0 This contention yields
two alleged results. First, it is said that insurance rates will rise if the doc-
trine is abrogated. 5' It has not been proven, however, that the allowance of
intrafamily suits has been a cause for any rate rise. Furthermore, the fact
that insurance rates possibly might rise is no real defense to the argument
that insurance will cover the loss. Secondly, it may be argued that insurance
companies have no experience in this field, and since their rates do not
reflect consideration of such suits, it would be unfair to the insurance com-
panies to subject them to claims not contemplated when the contract was
made. This contention lacks force since, in a policy of liability insurance
which purports to cover the persons who qualify under the definition of "in-
sured" within the policy contract, the company agrees to pay on behalf of
the insured all sums which he shall become legally obligated to pay as dam-
ages arising out of the activities covered in the contract. Unless the policy
has language expressly eliminating coverage of the insured for torts which he
commits against the members of his own household, then he will be covered
for these torts. "Standard insurance policies do not eliminate coverage to
the insured for nonintentional torts committed against the members of his
family."' 52 Hence, conceding the fact that insurance companies have had no
recent experience in determining rates in parent-child suit situations, by the
terms of "standard insurance policies" they should still be prepared to pay for
damages in such actions.
The Effect of Gelbman
The ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in Gelbman may well be a
harbinger of further action by New York's sister states to abrogate the
parent-child immunity doctrine for nonwillful torts.53 This abrogation may
either be total as in New York or in some way qualified, as in Wisconsin and
Minnesota.5 4  It is true that the greater number of states still follow the
rule announced in Hewellette but it seems increasingly hard to justify the
50. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 474, 174 N.E.2d 718, 720, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35,
37 (1961).
51. 12 S.D.L. REV. 364, 368 (1967).
52. Hinkle, Intrafamily Litigation-Parent and Child, 1968 INs. L.J. 133, 146.
53. Hawaii qualified the scope of the doctrine, citing Gelbman, in Tamashiro v.
DcGama, - Hawaii -, 450 P.2d 998 (1969).
54. No jurisdiction seems to have gone as far in abrogating the doctrine as New
York, for the court in GeIbman not only abrogated the doctrine totally but announced
it was applying the rationale in GeIbman retroactively to matters which had not yet
progressed to final judgment. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d
192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1969).
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
full import of the doctrine in the light of present-day realities.5 5 Since New
York's highest court has now unanimously abrogated the doctrine, the
prestige of this court may well cause other states to reconsider their positions.
Since New York has historically been a leader in insurance matters, 56 it
is not unlikely that the decision in Gelbman may prompt some deep thinking
on the part of insurance companies in order to assess their positions and the
alternatives available in the light of Gelbman. This concern will be especially
extensive in states, such as New York, where automobile insurance is com-
pulsory, since litigation between parent and child has usually arisen out of
auto accidents. Assuming that this will continue to be the most frequent situ-
ation in which the parent-child immunity doctrine will appear, it is certain
that insurance companies will be involved in a great number of suits between
parent and child.
Many avenues are open to insurance companies in adjusting to abro-
gation of the doctrine. It has been suggested that strict enforcement of the
cooperation clause,57 requiring an insured to assist his insurer in the de-
fense of litigation would be an effective means of discouraging collusion be-
tween the insured and the members of his family. 58 However, the cooper-
ation clause is subject to interpretation and the interpretation given by the
courts has usually favored the insured. The burden of proving a failure to
cooperate is on the insurer and a lack of good faith by the insured must be
proven, not inferred. 59 Unless the insured's actions appear so obviously a
sham to all parties and to the court, the insurer may find it difficult to
demonstrate the type of obstruction the court demands. 60 The advantage of
55. It should be noted, however, that certain states have recently reaffirmed their
adherence to the Hewellette rationale: Florida, Denault v. Denault, 220 So. 2d 27
(Dist. Ct. App. 1969); New Jersey, Franco v. Davis, 51 N.J. 237, 239 A.2d 1 (1968);
Tennessee, Wooley v. Parker, - Tenn. -, 432 S.W.2d 882 (1968); West Virginia,
Freeland v. Freeland, - W. Va.-, 162 S.E.2d 922 (1968).
56. New York has pioneered in antidiscrimination insurance law; the combining
of insurers for rate-making purposes; the establishment of security arrangements;
and commissioner control over liquidation of insurers. See C. KULP & J. HALL, CAS-
UALTY INSURANCE 958-1027 (4th ed. 1968).
57. E.g., Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured ...
The insured shall cooperate with the company and, upon the company's re-
quest, assist in making settlements, in the conduct of suits and in enforcing
any right of contribution or indemnity against any person or organization
who may be liable to the insured because of bodily injury, property damage or
loss with respect to which insurance is afforded under this policy; and the in-
sured shall attend hearings and trials and assist in securing and giving evi-
dence and obtaining the attendance of witnesses.
Government Employees Insurance Company, Policy A-4 (1968).
58. 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 805, 813-14.
59. Albert v. Public Serv. Mut. Cas. Ins. Corp., 266 App. Div. 284, 42 N.Y.S.2d
124 (1943).
60. Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928).
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resorting to a strict enforcement of the cooperation clause lies in its economy
of application and the lack of administrative procedure accompanying it.
However, in light of the high burden of proof placed on the insurer to prove
a failure to cooperate, this method may not be feasible.
If the insurance company were able to exclude the undesired risk, the
Gelbman decision would be of no significance. Whether the insurance
companies would want to alter their policies to exclude such risks is still an
open question. Absent statutory inhibitions, 61 it has been held that "the
insurer need not protect against all liabilities and . . . a clause exempting cer-
tain liabilities from coverage is valid."' 62 Absent statutory barriers there
would still be the question of whether public policy would allow an alteration
such as the one contemplated. A court could easily find that public policy
was a bar to exclusion. As stated in Gelbman, "it seems obvious that family
unity can only be preserved . . . by permitting the . . . action."163 Further-
more, the existence of a policy containing an intrafamily exclusion might very
well not be sufficient to satisfy a state's financial responsibility law, if one
exists in the state. For example, in Connecticut in 1966, the Connecticut
State Attorney General at the request of the Connecticut Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, rendered a formal opinion that in an automobile accident
in which a member of the insured's family was injured, the existence of such
a policy containing the intrafamily exclusion did not meet the standards of
that state's financial responsibility law. Consequently, an insured who was
involved in such an accident would have to obtain a release from the injured
relative, or post a cash bond or surrender his driver's license. Thus, acci-
dents involving minor relatives of the insured put the insured in an intoler-
able position. Therefore, the insurance department of the state took the
position that policies containing this type of exclusion would have to bear
a prominent warning legend to the effect that the policy might not be suffi-
cient to satisfy the financial responsibility laws. In preference to this, the
licensed Connecticut insurers chose to waive the exclusion on all policies.
Traditionally, an insurer could not limit its liability without granting some
consideration to its insured for reducing the coverage under the policy.
64
However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that an insurer
61. See, e.g., "No policy of automobile liability insurance . . . written or renewed
after July 1, 1969, shall contain an exclusion of liability for damages for bodily injury
solely because the injured person is a resident or member of the insured's household or
related to the insured by blood or marriage." Law of May 19, 1969, ch. 474, § 1,
Minn. Laws 530.
62. Hill v. Standard Mut. Cas. Co., 110 F.2d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir. 1940).
63. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 530 (1969).
64. See, e.g., Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. United States, 395 F.2d 176
(8th Cir. 1968).
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may limit its liability merely by postponing amendment until renewal, 5
and then attaching an endorsement that would be obvious to the policy
holder. The argument is that each year's insurance contract is a separate
and distinct entity and, hence, there is a right to modify the terms of the
contract yearly. 66
The use of arbitration between insured and insurer is another possible solu-
tion. Often an arbitration provision is provided with regard to the uninsured
motorist section of the liability policy. It would appear that the use of arbi-
tration is considered contrary to public policy in only nine states.67 Arbitra-
tion may be an effective device for three reasons. First, it does serve public
policy in that it remedies a wrong. Second, it effectively keeps cases off the
civil docket. Third, it affords the parties the opportunity to have their case
heard by a professional arbitrator who might have more expertise in the area
than the average juryman. The cost of arbitration, however, may not be so
much less than that of a trial so as to make it desirable in that regard.
Insurers could also provide alternative fixed benefits to members of the
family in lieu of any right of action. The objective of such a provision would
be to negate the effect of the Geibman decision while providing a satisfactory
remedy for the wrong that was committed. An insurance policy usually pro-
vides for such fixed benefits under the medical payments portion but only
for an additional premium. The insurer here, however, would apparently be
moving into the area of absolute liability, an area in which insurance com-
panies fear to tread.
Finally, an insurer could discontinue doing business in the state, although
this would create an impossible situation for local underwriters who operated
mainly or only in a state that had abrogated the doctrine. Further study of
the effects of abrogation would have to be undertaken before any insurance
company could prudently consider so drastic a move.
Conclusion
The doctrine of parent-child immunity for nonwillful torts is slowly dying in
American law. Only time will tell to what extent its demise has been
hastened by the Gelbman decision. More courts seem to be realizing that in
the field of parent-child immunity "[t]o allow such a distinction as now
exists between tort and other forms of action is indeed not only to perpetuate
confusion and irreconcilable decisions . . .but to entrench a policy from
65. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 400 F.2d 172 (1968).
66. Id. at 174.
67. Those states are: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia. See HOUSE COMM. ON TME JUDICIARY,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE STUDY, H.R. REP. No. 815, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967).
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which changing times have drained most of such vitality as it may have once
possessed."'68 As Judge Fuld said in his dissent in Badigian, "[a] rule which
so incongruously shields conceded wrongdoing bears a heavy burden of justifi-
cation."69
This "heavy burden" will be able to be justified to a lesser degree in each
succeeding year and the only question that will remain is to what extent the
doctrine will be altered. For those states seeking a total abrogation, the
Court of Appeals decision in Gelbman will be the clarion call. As more
states abrogate or qualify the doctrine, the insurance companies will be
faced with an increasing number of law suits to defend and Gelbman may,
in the final analysis, be the most important insurance case of recent years.
68. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436, 224 A.2d 588, 591 (1966).
69. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 475, 174 N.E.2d 718, 721, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35,
38 (1961).
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